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Abstract 
This paper seeks to examine and present a review of the correlation between the 
institutional structure of the regulatory body, in this case the Malaysian Communications 
and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), and the exercise of its enforcement powers 
provided under the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 ('CMA 1998'), in the face of 
the convergence of telecommunication, broadcasting and multimedia industries in 
Malaysia. The focus of this paper is to highlight the various enforcement mechanisms 
envisaged under the CMA 1998 and the corresponding effectiveness in view of the 
institutional setting therein. Central to the instant study is the possibility and viability of civil 
enforcement of the various provisions enumerated under the CMA 1998, apart from the 
conventional state-criminal prosecution on any potential infringements. 
Abstrak 
Kertas projek ini bertujuan untuk menyelidik dan mempersembahkan satu tinjauan 
terhadap hubungan di antara struktur institusi sesebuah badan regulatori, dalam kes ini 
Suruhanjaya Komunikasi dan Multimedia Malaysia (SKMM), dan perlaksanaan kuasa 
penguatkuasaan yang diperuntukkan di bawah Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 
('AKM 1998J, di dalam menghadapi pencantuman industri-industri telekomunikasi, 
penyiaran dan multimedia di Malaysia. Fokus kertas projek ini adalah untuk memberi . 
sorotan terhadap mekanisma-mekanisma penguatkuasaan yang dibayangkan di bawah 
AKM 1998, dan kebekesanan mekanisma tersebut berlandaskan kepada latar belakang 
institusi baru ini. Tumpuan kertas projek ini ialah kemungkinan dan kesesuaian 
penguatkuasaan secara sivil ke atas pelbagai peruntukkan yang tercatit di bawah AKM 
1998, selain daripada penguatkuasaan da/am bentuk jenayah yang lazimnya dijalankan 
oleh badan-badan penguatkuasaan ke atas sebarang kesalahan. 
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Chapter 1: Background 
The provision of telecommunication services in Malaysia, like any other form of public 
utilities, was historically a direct matter under the purview of the st t inc th c I nial era, 
and later the federal government upon attainment of ind p nd nc f th untry. Myriad 
factors may have contributed to this historical development. Th f inv stment and 
technology required as well as public interest seems to account pred minantly for the state 
direct provision of the services concerned'. 
Nevertheless, industrialization and the resultant rapid economic development experienced 
by the country in the last two decades has evident trend of escalating demand for better 
quality of the service provision as well as accessibility to the public utilities, which has now 
became basic necessity of the modern society. This has, by and large, posted an eminent 
challenge on the state's ability and capacity to cope with the increasing expectation of the 
public on the service delivery of public utilities. This scenario does not come by surprise as 
witnessed in other developing countries, and that of other developed nations2. 
Alongside with the economic development, fundamental structural revolution to the 
telecommunication market was only introduced, mainly attributed to the launched of the 
Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) project in 1997, one of the main thrust for the 
accomplishment of a developed nation status as envisioned under the Vision 2020 
aspiration. In deed, prior to 1997, deregulation of the telecommunication industry in 
Malaysia has started with the proliferation of the concept of liberalization of state-owned 
public utilities in the 80s', as advocated in other jurisdictions. The Jabatan Telekom 
1 
See for example Legal and Institutional Aspects of Regulation - Online Module 6, ITU-infoDev ICT 
Regulation Toolkit, Chapter 2 at pp.4-7. Available online at www.ictrequlationtoolkit.org as of May 
2008. The chapter provides a summary background on the gradual transition of the 
Telecommunications industry from the state-owned monopoly environment to the free-competition environment. 
2 See Note [1] above 
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Malaysia (JTM) was formed as an agency tasked with the provision of telecommunication 
services in the country, saw the first step in liberalizing the telecommunication market . 
Dissolution of the JTM, the natural monopoly In the t I c mrnunl ti n m rk t in the 
Bhd (Telekom) 
inherited statutorily the Incumbent JTM legal status. It has neverth I ss allowed the initial 
liberalization of the telecommunication market by introducing the element of market 
competition to substitute the sole monopolistic moder'. At. that stage, telecommunication 
services were characterized by purely voice services, be it fixed line voice services or the 
limited provision of cellular voice services5. Telekom evolved as the dominant player in the 
market, largely due to the well-built incumbent legacy network it inherited". 
Subsequently, technological advancement in the global communications industry, both the 
hardware peripheral as well as the supporting software development introduced new 
advanced services to the customer that were once not imaginable. The new wave of 
multimedia content delivery over the communication network has changed the way of 
modern life in all aspects thinkable, greatly manifested first in the form of electronic 
commerce, then propagated to other perspective of personal and daily life, such as 
education, leisure and community network". Against this backdrop, from being viewed 
purely as the enabler for the delivery of advance multimedia content and services, 
3 
For detail elaboration on the evolution of the liberalization of the telecommunication market in 
Malaysia, see note [1 OJ below. 
4 
See MCMC (2007). Industry Report 2007 (Volume 2): A Comparative of Telecommunications 
Trends, pp. 5 - 1 O. 
5 
See MCMC (2004). Communication and Multimedia: Market and Financial Review 3rd Quarter 
2004, pp. 6-7. 
6 
Telekom was reported as the main industry contributor to the Bursa Malaysia in terms of its 
market capitalization and contribution. See MCMC (2004). Market Performance: C & M Bulletin 
2004 pp. 7 -8. 
7 
See note [4] at pp. 1 O - 15. The report evaluated the recent technological advancement and 
provides general information on the new trend of service delivery worldwide. 
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telecommunication industry proved in itself it has much economic value yet to be 
unleashed with the convergence of the multimedia and the network industry8• 
It was premised on this very background, which w s lso oh r nt with th government 
policy under the MSC project that new regulatory regime w s intr due d in response to 
the converged communication and multlmedla Industry· . This was crystallized by 
streamlining the function of the then JTM, in the telecommunication sector, and the 
Ministry of Information (MOI), which was in charge of the broadcasting sector, under the 
Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission ('the MCMC') established under 
the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission Act 1998 ('CMCA 1998')ft 
~ 
Cl Parallel to the development was the corresponding consolidation of the? 
en 
§ 
Telecommunications Act 1950 and the Broadcasting Act 1988 into the Communication~ ~· 
ee 
and Multimedia Act 1998 ('CMA 1998') 10. Detail of the new regulatory regime established~ ; 
~ ·~ 
:::J Cl.) will be discussed in the next section. P· ·:'.::: 
) 1- ~ ) 
8 
See MCMC (2007). Chapter 7: Steps into the Future - An Outlook, Industry Performance Report 
2006, pp. 138 -140. 
9 
See the Minister's address to the Dewan Rakyat during the 2nd and 3rd reading of the 
Communications and Multimedia Bill 1998 on 20 Julai 1998 (Hansard at page 45) 10 
See Angeline Lee (2001 ). Convergence In Telecom, Broadcasting and IT: A Comparative 
Analysis of Regulatory Approaches In Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore. Singapore Journal of 
International & Comparative Law (2001) 5 pp 674 - 695. 
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Chapter 2: The New Regulatory Framework 
2.1 'Regulatory Framework' defines 
The author contends that it may well serve the purpose in our current pursuit to first 
endeavor a brief discussion on the various forms of Regulatory Fr mework, which has 
lucidly colored the modern system of governmental admlnistr tion. Liter tures by political 
scientists on this topic are never lacking. In fact, central to these literatures is the argument 
on the most suitable regulatory regime for the effective governmental administration in a 
given social-political-economy setting. By and large, it seems that the concept of regulation 
is generally said to represent certain form of state intervention to influence the industry, 
market or community behavior to achieve specific public goals 11• 
It is crucial to appreciate that the key to this loose definition of regulation is that the 
industry, market or community concern is presumed to be autonomous upon its initial 
inception. In another word, the autonomous system is subjected to the function of the free 
· market forces, or commonly referred to as the 'invisible hand' in economy term. State 
intervention in the form of regulation is therefore mostly perceived only desirable to 
achieve specific public goals, the benefits of which should, as far as possible outweighs 
the costs of compliance. While this presumption may be true to certain extent, it does not, 
some argues, reflect a thorough representation of the concept of regulation 12. 
11 
See I. Bartle & P. Vass (2005). Self-Regulation and the Regulatory State: A Survey of Policy and 
Practice. Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries, The University of Bath 2005. J. Braithwaite 
(2006). Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies. World Development Vol.34, No.5, 
pp.884 - 898, 2006. Better Regulation Task Force (2001 ). Economic Regulation, July 2001. 
Commission of the European Communities (2001 ). European Governance: A White Paper, 
Brussels, 25 July 2001. R. Mayntz (2001 ). From Government to Governance: Political Steering in 
Modern Societies. 
12 See Final Report: Study on Co-Regulation Measures in the Media Sector, conducted by the 
Hans-Bredow-lnstitut for Media Research at the University of Hamburg, a study undertaken for the 
European Commission, Directorate Information Society and Media, Unit A 1, Audiovisual and Media 
Policies. The draft published on 13 Jan 2006. 
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Indeed, one may find that this form of state intervention varies in a spectrum dependant on 
the degree and level of state intervention. Conversely, it is also suggested that the 
spectrum of regulation resemble the different level of p rticip tion b tw n both the 
regulator and the subject of regulation i.e. the regul t d. B d n thi b sic idea 
literatures has flourished into various models of regu/ tory it. m w r . Whil researches 
into this area has been abundant, with the necessary diversity in th findings, mostly 
attributed to their respective model of applicability, to summarize the same has not been 
an easy job in any event. 
To throw light in this aspect, common features of most classes of regulatory framework 
researched may be conveniently categorized into four categories13, namely (i) Statutory 
Regulation, (ii) Co-Regulation, (iii) Self-Regulation, and (iv) No Regulation. Each of the 
above-named categories has their own attributes and characteristics, and necessarily 
connotes their respective advantages and shortcomings. Application of any form of the 
regulatory framework would depend on the maturity of the particular market or industry 
under consideration 14. 
Ultimately, one need to realize that variant based on the categories of basic frameworks 
listed above are always possible for any framework concern is in its very own nature 
representing a mean to achieve specific end-result envisaged. Therefore, discussion on 
the regulatory framework would inescapably entails scrutiny of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the framework in achieving the objectives set, measured against the 
~~See Better Regulation Task Force (2000). Alternatives to State Regulation. July 2000. 
See Better Regulation Task Force (2005). Better Regulation for Civil Society: Making Life Easier 
tor Those Who Helps Others. Published onllne on November 2005, available at www.brtf.qov.uk 
Page I 9 
segment of market by which it operates and the given social-political-economy setting at 
that given point in time 15• 
Be that as it may, bearing in mind the caution elaborated in th pr c ding paragraph, 
attributes and characteristics of each of the categories may be discussed for the purpose 
of our instant investigation. Statutory Regulation connotes the direct and complete state 
control over the subject matter. In this regard, the important functions of policy making, 
supervision, enforcement and adjudication are all within the state direct purview. Statutory 
Regulation has always been referred to as the 'traditional' or the 'command-and-control' 
regime for the unidirectional policing of the regulated. This single channel system is at time 
being criticized for its rigid command structure, however, there are research that tends to 
support its application in certain market condition, i.e. market with little competition, and in 
instances to achieve long-term objectives for the public benefit. 
Co-Regulation on the other hand is a semblance of the 'relaxed' Statutory Regulation and 
an 'extension' of the Self-Regulation. As its name 'Co' suggests, Co-Regulation normally 
operates on the basis of participation of the regulated, in varying degree in either the policy 
formation, supervision, enforcement and adjudication process. In its most common form, 
the policy making process is reserved exclusively to the state whereas the execution, 
monitoring and enforcement is entrusted to the Co-Regulatory body with certain oversight 
mechanism by the state installed as backstop. Also, the Co-Regulatory body will normally 
derives its legal recognition from specific principal statutory instruments enacted by the 
Parliament that spell out its powers, functions, obligations and composition. The most 
important feature of Co-Regulatory body is perhaps its ability to prosecute either in the civil 
or the criminal nature for non-compliance of sanctions on the regulated. 
15 
See C.C. Novion (2003). Best Practices on Regulatory Impact Analysis in OECD Countries 
presented at the conference Regulatory Governance Initiative in South East Europe, Bulgaria, 23 
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Whereas, Self-Regulation16 has been commonly used to denote two broad scenarios: the 
Regulated Self-Regulation and the Pure Self-Regulation. In the formal, the regulatory body 
receives legal recognition in the form of statutory provision for its istence. In most 
instances, the regulatory body has a legal entity with specific powers, functions and 
objectives to be delivered that has legal backing. However, it distinguishes from Co- 
Regulation in the sense of the legal binding effect of sanctions issued on the regulated. 
Typical form of sanctions, so to speak, is through voluntary industry code, voluntary 
agreement, best practices, general guidelines, and other form of non-binding instruments. 
This characteristic holds true for most of the Co-Regulatory body with the exception to 
professional body such as the legal, medical, engineering and accountancy where the. 
concept of high professional ethics warrant formal binding effect on sanction preferred on 
non-compliance 17. 
In the latter, Pure Self-Regulation does not, in most cases, receive formal or legal 
recognition of its purpose and functions, as mostly it existed as a form of special interest 
group, watchdog or pressure group. This latter form of Self-Regulation is considered by 
many the true mechanisms in an autonomous market with self-functioning and self- 
corrective measures 18• Despite the dual facets of Self-Regulation, and the inherent nature 
of non-binding sanctioning power, in practice, it is observed that the perceived threats of 
more severe form of government intervention, through more direct means of enforcement 
Jan 2003. 
16 
See D. Brereton (2002). The Role of Self-Regulation in Improving Corporate Social Performance: 
The Case of the Mining Industry. Presented to the Australian Institute of Criminology Conference on 
Current Issues in Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance, Melbourne, September 2002. 17 
Other variant of co-regulatory framework is seen in S. Turnbull (2007). The Imperative and 
Benefits of Introducing Outcome based Privatized Co-Regulation. International of Self-Governance. 
Available online at www.linkedin.com 
18 
See evaluation in M. Sidel (2008). The Promise and Limits of Collective Action for Nonprofit Self- 
Regulatlon: Evidence from Asia. University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper Number 08-06. 
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often motivate compliance even though there is no ex ante legal backstop of 
enforcement 19. 
As alluded to in the foregoing paragraph, the demarcation between the Co-Regulation and 
the Self-Regulation category may not, at time be so straightforward as discussed above. 
The gray area between the two is sometime called the Quasi-Regulation. What can be 
discerned with based on literatures is this: Quasi-Regulation represents an intermediate 
regime between the two ends of Co-Regulation and Self-Regulation. It distinguishes from 
one another based on the characteristic it resembles that may tilts between the two end of 
the scale. Yet again, the choice of the attributes that characterize the regime has to be 
suited to the market conditions and the objectives it envisaged to achieve20. 
Indeed, the collusion, or rather fusion between the Co-Regulation and Self-Regulation as 
crystallizes in the form of Quasi-Regulation is indispensable in practice. The rationale for 
this, some suggest, is that in order to enjoy the fullest benefits associate with the moving 
away from the Command-and-Control regulatory regime, fuzziness of the same is 
invariable. Benefits, primarily in the form of effective knowledge and expertise sharing, 
flexibility and adaptability, lower regulatory and regulatory compliance costs, and better 
market function to avoid market failure, entails the suitable adaptation of the regime as it 
evolves in response to the changing market conditions. 
This reasoning that captures the element of adaptation and evolution of the regulatory 
regime also finds it support in researches that advocate the concept of the cycle of 
19 
See N. Lundblad & A. Kiefer (2002). The Economy Efficiency of Self-Regulation: Two Case 
Studies. Presented at 1 r" Bl LETA Annual Conference April 2002 at Free University, Amsterdam. 20 
See OFCOM (2004). OFCOM Statement on Criteria for Promoting Effective Co and Self- 
regulation. And OFCOM (2008). OFCOM Consultation on Initial Assessment of When to Adopt Co. 
and Self-regulation. Both available at www.ofcom.gov.uk 
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regulatory evolution21. Main thrust to this concept rested on the argument that regulatory in 
itself is not a static process contrary to common believe. As the market evolves with time 
and the conditions vary, the corresponding regulatory regime ought to be revised to 
respond to changes, lest it shall risk outliving progress. According to this school of thought, 
the single dimensional analysis of the categories of Regulatory Framework as above first 
indicated, may be deceiving into believe that regulation is static. 
While there may necessary be time frame for operation of a particular category of the 
regime, it concedes that for any given market, it will inescapably experiences the transient 
transition from the one extreme end of Statutory Regulation to the other end of Self- 
Regulation, or vice versa. The inherent weaknesses underpin each of this evolution stages 
has been accounted for such eventuality: for when effectiveness and efficiency has 
reached the stage where it proves a disservice to the aim it intends to achieve, and market 
failure occurs, direct state intervention ensues and the cycle perpetuates22. Diversion from 
the cycle, has not find any concrete support in literatures, while some segment maintained 
that healthy competition may sounds a potential solution to the perpetuity of the cycle and 
an en route to the ultimate solution to remain in the balance or preferred state of Quasi- 
Regulation. 
The author contends that the basic concept of Regulatory Framework elaborately 
discussed above suffices for the purpose of the instant study on the regulatory framework 
of the telecommunication industry in Malaysia, which will be discussed in the next section. 
2.2 Framework under the Telecommunications Act 1950 and Broadcasting Act 1988 
(the 'old framework') 
21 
Some of the problems as highlighted by S.H. Zheng (2003). A Discourse on the Legal Framework 
of China's Public Utility Enterprises. Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law (2003) 7 
qp. 86- 101.. . . . . 
See M. Klein & N. Roger (1994). Back to the Future: The Potential in Infrastructure Privatisation. 
Public Policy for the Private Sector, The World Bank FDP Note No.30. 2-4 
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Before embarking further discussion on the new regulatory regime, it is only appropriate to 
gauge some basic understanding on the old regulatory regime provided under the 
repealed Telecommunications Act 1950 and the Broadcasting Act 1988 for better 
appreciation of the fundamental changes brought about by the new legislation. Under the 
old telecommunication regime, the framework consists of three main components, namely 
(i) the Government through the exercise of the powers by the Minister, (ii) the Director 
General of the Telecommunication and (iii) the potential service providers. 
Part II, llA and V of the repealed Telecommunications Act 195023 jointly provide the 
institutional set-up of the framework, in terms of the power and function of the Minister, the 
Director General of Telecommunications and the separate financial structure upon which 
the Director General functions. The remaining Part 111, IV, and VI provide the sanction, 
penalties and enforcement of the repealed Act. To appreciate the nature of the regulatory 
regime under the said Act, Part II is particularly apposite where it states: 
3. (1) The Government shall have the exclusive privilege of 
establishing, maintaining and working telecommunications in 
Malaysia. 
(3) The Minister may grant a license on such conditions and in 
consideration of such payments as he thinks fit to any person to establish, 
maintain or work a telecommunications on any part of 
Malaysia ... (emphasis added) 
23 
Part II stipulates the 'Privileges and Powers of the Government' in respect to the 'exclusive 
privilege' of the government in relation to any matters related to provision of telecommunications 
services, including the grant of license and the institutional setting and powers of the Minister and 
Director General thereof. Part llA provides the establishment and operation of the 
Telecommunication Fund, whereas Part V provides for the 'exclusive privilege' of the government in 
regard to radiocommunication services. 
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Further, it is compulsory under the regime that the Minister is to appoint the Director 
General of Telecommunications24• The duties and functions of the Director General are 
provided as: 
38 (1) It shall be the duty and function of the Director General - 
(a) to exercise regulatory functions In respect of the conduct of 
telecommunication services In Malaysia including the 
establishment of standards and their enforcement; 
(b) to regulate the use of the radio frequency spectrum; 
(c) to regulate the national use of the geostationary-satellite orbit ... 
(d) to represent the Government in respect of international 
telecommunication matters which are on a government-to- 
government basis and to do all things necessary for this purpose; 
(e) to promote the provision of international transit services by persons 
providing telecommunication services in Malaysia; 
(f) to promote the interests of consumers, purchasers and other 
users of the telecommunication services or telecommunication 
apparatus in Malaysia (including in particular, those who are 
disabled) in respect of the prices charged for, and the quality 
and variety of, services provided and apparatus supplied; 
(g) to encourage major users of telecommunication services 
whose places of business are outside Malaysia to establish 
places of business in Malaysia; 
(h) to promote research into and the development and use of new 
techniques by persons engaged in commercial activities 
connected with telecommunications in Malaysia; 
(i) to enable such persons to establish and maintain a leading 
position in the field of telecommunications. 
(Emphasis added) 
In addition thereto, it is also provided that the Director General is to comply with the 
following policy objectives: 
38 (2) In discharging the duties imposed on him by subsection (1), the 
Director General shall have regard to - 
(a) efficiency and economy; 
(b) satisfying all reasonable demands for telecommunication 
services; 
(c) fostering the development and expansion of the 
telecommunication service of the world in collaboration with 
other countries and international organizations concerned with 
world telecommunications; 
24 Section 3A Telecommunications Act 1950 
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(d) the promotion of measures for the safety of life through 
telecommunications; 
(e) the provision of domestic and overseas telecommunication services 
at rate consistent with efficient service; 
(f) the promotion of research in telecommunications, in particular, the 
peaceful uses of telecommunication technology including that 
relating to the geostationary-satellite orbit; and 
(g) collaboration with educational institutions for the promotion of 
technical education in the field of telecommunications. 
(Emphasis added) 
In scrutinizing Part II of the Act, one need to remember that the repealed Act in its original 
form reserved the powers in any dealing with Telecommunications to the government, and 
impliedly the Minister, as it said, exclusively. This is entirely unsurprising given the specific 
historical setting, considering the fact that any other form of public utilities, e.g. electricity, 
water, postal service etc. are all perceived as critical infrastructure of the state, more so 
under emergency and war state. In addition to that, the central controlled and planned 
economy system inherited since the colonial era has its pivotal role to play in this legacy 
development. 
The residuary power of the Minister to grant a license for the operation of 
telecommunications and the appointment of the Director General came by way of 
amendment decades after the coming into force of the original Act. This later enactment 
symbolizes, knowingly or unknowingly, the preparatory steps toward further liberalization 
of the telecommunications industry. The arrangement of the repealed Act reflects the 
relatively simple or rather the monopolistic market condition at that time, for obvious 
reason that is coherent with the attitude of the government of the day as alluded to earlier. 
It may be seem at fleeting glimpse that the repealed Act had very much akin to that of 
Statutory Regulation, in view of the substantial reservation of powers vested in the Minister. 
Based on this, it seems that while the Minister may allow the provision of 
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telecommunications service to a valid licensee appointed under the Act, this residuary 
power is not comparable to the exclusivity enjoys by the government. More so, while the 
licensee may 'establish, maintain or work a telecommunications', in retaining the 
exclusivity, the government has the final say in terms and conditions of the provision, that 
would definitely ensure better, if not full compliance and delivery of any policy envisaged 
by the government. 
This is done, as evident, fortified in respect of the duties and functions delegated to the 
Director General. In fact, it can be considered that subsection 2 to section 3B has 
unequivocally postulated the policy objectives of the government, delegated for its 
execution upon the Director General. Hence, the overriding principle of the whole regime 
hinges on the establishment of an efficient and cost economical regulatory system in 
paving the way in fostering the development and expansion of telecommunications 
services on the one hand, and promoting the interest of the customers on the other. 
Nonetheless, it is observed that while customer interest has been categorically named as 
one of the many policy objectives, it has not fully attained what is perceived as the modern 
idea of customer right to access for the interest recognized then is limited to the basic rate 
control. 
Though under the repealed regime the Director General has been tasked with the 
delegated functions previously exercisable directly by the Minister, the ultimate control still 
remained with the Minister. This is illustrative, particularly so in the following aspects: (i) 
power to make regulations in all matters of telecommunications25; (ii) decision on the grant 
or revocation of license, and the specific terms and conditions26; (iii) the determination of 
the maximum amount of the annual development expenditure by the Minister and the 
25 See s.7 of the repealed Act. 
26 S.3 and 8 of the repealed Act. 
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Minister of Finance from the Telecommunication Fund for the Director General": and (iv) 
the Minister's duty to report to the Parliament28. 
It is also noted that enforcement of the repealed Act has been largely entrusted on the 
Director General29. Contravention of the sanctions prescribed entails pecuniary penalty in 
the form of fines in most cases, with the more severe offence being treated as criminal in 
nature where imprisonment sentence may be imposeo upon conviction at the criminal 
court". The offences sanctioned under the repealed Act essentially dealt with physical 
mischief in the form of fraud or damage caused to the telecommunications system, 
including the content or messages being transmitted, apart from the offence of unlicensed 
service provision31. 
On the other hand, the Broadcasting Act 1988 has remained in a rather crude form where 
apart from reserving the exclusivity of any form of broadcast activities and its associate 
contents to the government, regulatory framework is typically within the Minister direct 
control". Enforcement, predominantly on the licensing aspect and the use of broadcast 
and reception related apparatus, was carried out by authorized officers appointed by the 
Minister33. Liability of offences under the Act is strict and incurred financial sanction in most 
cases, with imprisonment sentence reserved as alternative for more severe infringement34. 
27 S. 9D, 9E of the repealed Act. 
28 S. 9L of the repealed Act. 
29 See Part IV, V and VI on the enforcement of the various provisions under the repealed Act. 
30 The criminal nature of the offence is evident from the manner in which investigation is to be 
carried out. The extensive powers to conduct search with or without warrant, examination of 
witnesses and the admissibility of the evidence thereof, and the prosecution of the offender 
witnessed the assimilation of the procedure practiced by the police under criminal investigation. 
31 see Part IV of the repealed Act which provides for the penalties for offences stipulated therein 
which run from s.21 until s.33 of the Act. 
32 Part II, Ill and IV of the Act stipulated the powers of the Minister in relation to the license to 
broadcast and matters related thereto. 
33 See Part V of the Act. 
34 Sees. 18 of the Act which provides the penalty under the Act. 
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2.3 Framework under the Malaysian Communications and Mu/timed/a Commission 
Act 1998 and the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (the 'new framework') 
Under the new regulatory regime, the platform consists of an enriched number of actors, 
evidenced the seemingly more complex communications market, in line with the 
international trend 35• As explained, towards the end of the 201h century, technology 
advancement has brought about the convergence in the technical aspect of the 
telecommunications and broadcasting, and served an irresistible impetus for the 
subsequent convergence in the advance service provisions, which entails the necessary 
market combination and structural fusion. This has allowed the once separate industry, 
and its stakeholders to interplay within this new common platform. 
In response to this wave of convergence within the two industries, the CMA and CMCA 
1998 jointly provide a seemingly flexible regime, both in terms of the regulatory structure 
and regulatory instruments that is adaptable to the highly dynamic market conditions. 
Underpinning this flexibility is the concept of 'technology neutrality', whereby instead of 
market segmentation based on technology, that proved too fast to be obsolete, rather the 
new platform gravitates toward the 'activities-oriented' segregation and regulation. Hence, 
from the once horizontal-technology-based regime, the new regulatory regime introduces 
the vertical-activities layer-based regime that is better accommodative to rapid technology 
advancement36. 
35 The international trend of moving towards a 'converged regulatory mechanism' should also be 
read with the parallel and prevailing deregulation of the state-own monopoly industry. In gist, the 
process of deregulation has its historical justification, which was predominantly based on the quest 
for better distributive and allocative efficiency in terms of the investment and provision of quality, 
and equitable telecommunications services to the larger masses of the society. See Chapter 1, The 
New Paradigm for Network Utilities', Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation and 
Competition, World Bank Policy Research Report 2004 (co-publication with Oxford University Press) 
available online at www.worldbank.org as of May 2008. 
36 More detail on convergence of the technology and industry, as well as the corresponding 
regulatory and institutional impacts, see US experience outlined by P. Larouche (2003). Dealing 
with Convergence at the International Level. Singapore Law Review (2003) 23 Sing LR 85 -114. 
Page j 19 
In fact, in view of the emergence of this complex network of stakeholders ' 
interconnection and the daunting regulatory challenge foreseeable, the new piece of 
legislation demonstrates great wisdom in that, while arguably it had been enshrined and 
adopted in the repealed old regime, it spelt out the clear policy objectives as common 
aspiration for all stakeholders concerned under the CMA 1998. This general, yet clear 
policy objectives is crucial in two respects, firstly it promotes and assures regulatory 
certainty, particularly so in new service areas that requires huge investment in both the 
advance infrastructure upgrade and innovation of advance services. Secondly, it provides 
a yardstick for the measurement of the Regulatory Impact Analysis for any regulation 
introduced by the regulator. 
These objectives are termed the 1 O National Policy Objectives for the Communications 
and Multimedia Industry' which are as follows: 
(a) to establish Malaysia as a major global centre and hub for communications and 
multimedia information and content services; 
(b) to promote a civil society where information-based services will provide the 
basis of continuing enhancements to quality of work and life; 
(c) to grow and nurture local information resources and cultural representation that 
facilitate the national identity and global diversity; 
(d) to regulate the long-term benefit of the end user; 
(e) to promote a high level of consumer confidence in service delivery from the 
industry; 
(f) to ensure an equitable provision of affordable services over ubiquitous national 
infrastructure; 
(g) to create a robust applications environment for end users; 
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(h) to facilitate the efficient allocation of resources such as skilled labour, capital, 
knowledge and national assets; 
(i) to promote the development of capabilities and skills within Malaysia's 
convergence industries; and 
(j) to ensure information security and network reliability and integrity. 
On top of the 1 O National Policy Objectives is the crucial statutory assurance on prohibition 
of Internet censorship37• These policy objectives, when read together, indicate a new 
developmental aspect of the country that presupposes necessary economic and social 
transformation that is partly contributory to the master plan both under the MSC project 
and the nation's long term vision. Indeed, it may be observed that the CMA 1998 regime 
encompasses the whole spectrum of economic regulation, technical regulation, consumer 
protection, and social regulation towards achieving the policy objectives. The policy 
objectives therefore serve as the regulatory umbrella where the separate subsection of 
regulations develops its context. Subsequently, this form of 'objective-oriented' model 
canvasses a pyramid of regulatory objectives that evolves and obligated on all 
stakeholders concerned as envisaged under the CMA and CMCA 199838. 
First and foremost, the Minister while still retains the power in relation to policy setting and 
certain other crucial subject matters of politically sensitive in nature, including licensing 
and spectrum assignment per se, in exercising the ministerial powers and functions are 
37 See s.3(3) CMA 1998. 
38 Indeed, the various aspects of regulation e.g. te~med under the label of economic, technical, 
consumer, and social regulation under the new regime, could best translate the very essence of 
common regulatory objectives endorsed universally as crucial to facilitate the transition process 
from the state-own monopoly to free-competition market environment, which in turn requires the 
adept balancing between healthy market ~ompetition and consumer welfare, with the state retaining 
the backstop function to prevent market failure. 
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statute-bound to ensure compliance with the policy objective39. The MCMC on the other 
hand, had more stringent yet concise duties and functions, which represent detail 
translation based on the basic policy objectives, to comply and execute as stipulated under 
the new regime. Amongst these functions are: 
(a) to advise the Minister on all matters concerning the national policy objectives 
for communications and multimedia activities; 
(b) to implement and enforce the provisions of the communications and multimedia 
laws; 
(c) to regulate all matters relating to communications and multimedia activities not 
provided for in the communications and multimedia law; 
(d) to consider and recommend reforms to the communications and multimedia 
laws; 
(e) to supervise and monitor communications and multimedia activities; 
(f) to encourage and promote the development of the communications and 
multimedia industry including in the area of research and training; 
(g) to encourage and promote self-regulation in the communications and 
multimedia industry; 
(h) to promote and maintain the integrity of all persons licensed or otherwise 
authorized under the communications and multimedia laws; 
(i) to render assistance in any form to, and to promote cooperation and 
coordination amongst, persons engaged in communications and multimedia 
activities; and 
O) to carry out any function under any written law as may be prescribed by the 
Minister by notification published in the Gazatte. 
39 The Minister decision on all matters is required to be consistent with the objectives of the Act, for 
example as provided under s.7(2) CMA 1998 which provides that the Ministerial Direction shall be 
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Industry forums in the form of Access Forum, Technical and Standard Forum, Content 
Forum and Consumer Forum on the other hand, has been established under the new 
regime as provided under the CMA 1998. These statute-based forums share the common 
objective to promote self-regulation within the ambit of their respective narrow applications. 
Industrial codes based on voluntary adoption have been developed and registered with the 
MCMC40. It is within this well-defined institutional structure and the corresponding pyramid 
of policy objectives that the new regime operates, which may be conveniently summarized 
in the following diagrams: 
Minister 
MCMC 
Industry Forums 
Appeal 
Tribunal 
Licensees 
NGO and other 
stakeholders 
Figure 1: Institutional Structure under the new regime 
consistent with the objects of the Act. 
40 Similar institutional set-up is evident in advance countries. See European Commission (2004). 
Self-regulation of Digital Media Converging on the Internet: Industry Codes of Conduct in Sectoral 
Analysis. Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy, Oxford University Centre for Socio- 
Legal Studies, 30 April 2004. 
Page I 23 
Based on the foregoing new institutional structure articulated in Figure 1, it is evident that 
the new regulatory regime introduced under the CMA and CMCA 1998 envisaged a 
balance semblance of different regulatory models at work. As illustrated earlier, apart from 
the various industrial forums that operate on the premise of self-regulation, the Minister's 
residual power in matters pertaining to the grant of specific license 41 and spectrum 
allocation and any conditions pertaining thereto42, two of the most crucial· aspects of 
telecommunication and broadcasting provision which signify in a subtle manner the ability 
of the State to determine the level of market competition, registered the direct state 
interventionist approach. This direct state intervention is not however absolute as what 
they have enjoyed before under the former state-owned monopolistic condition. 
It is observed that even in these two most crucial aspects of licensing and the allocation of 
spectrum, the Minister acts upon advise of the MCMC43, which in turn necessitates, 
despite sometimes indirectly, the input and earlier consultation from all stakeholders 
concern through the various industry forums or licensees44. Under the new regime, there 
are instances where the MCMC's advice though not legally binding on the Minister45, the 
fact that the mandated procedural requirement to seek recommendation from the MCMC 
in practice renders any potential arbitrary refusal of the recommendation politically 
unpopular, let alone the high risk of being subject to severe criticisms from existing and 
potential investors alike46. In most circumstances, it is generally provided under the new 
regime that any variance between the recommendation of the MCMC and the decision of 
41 As provided under Part IV of CMA 
42 See Chapter 1, Part VII of CMA 
43 See s.29, and s.172 of CMA. 
44 This is done through instruments such as Public Inquiry, Public Consultation or the various 
industry dialogues as has been consistently held annually from 2000-2006. 
45 For example, the Minister is not mandated by law to consult any licensees or the Commission for 
the issuance of Ministerial Determination, as provided under s.1 O of CMA. 
46 See Explanatory Statement No.21 and 22 of the Communications and Multimedia Bill 1998 (D.R. 
15/98) presented for the first reading in the Dewan Rakyat on 13 July 1998. 
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the Minister shall be notified to the parties concerned in writing, detailing the reasons for 
such decision and the avenues47, in certain contexts, of review48 or appeal against such 
decision49. 
On the other hand, as a general observation, suffice here to say that the new regime 
envisaged the MCMC to function under the Co-regulatory model even though the MCMC 
is tasked, amongst others, to promote self-regulation of the industry. In this sense, the 
MCMC has predominantly engaged the participatory mode from all stakeholders concern 
in the regulatory process. It is notable that under this new regime, the task of policy setting 
and review is reserved to the Ministry whereas the MCMC is interested solely on the 
implementation and enforcement which translates the policy identified into actual roll-out". 
This form of functional delineation or separation between the Ministry and the MCMC 
resonates in coherent with the international best practice of ministerial accountability51, in 
term of policy direction, to the electorates through the Parliament. Whereas the MCMC, 
the non-elected administrative arm is deemed most appropriate to restraint its functions to 
the implementation and enforcement under the modern governmental machinery that 
ascribed with the doctrine of separation of powers, and the accountability thereof52. The 
interplay between these different regulatory models is best illustrated in the figure below: 
47 e.g. s. 30(6) and (7) of CMA. 
48 Review by the Appeal Tribunal as provided under s.18 of CMA. 
49 See Explanatory Statement No. 45 and 46 ~~ich explained the relationship between the self- 
regulatory Industrial Forum and the role of the Minister envisaged .un?er such model. 
50 See A. Henten, R. Samarajiwa, W. H. Melody (2003). Designing Next Generation Telecom 
Regulation: ICT Convergence or Multisector Utility? Report on The World Dialogue on Regulation 
for Network Economies (WDR) 2002, Chapter 2 and 8. 
51 See w. Min (1999). Telecommunications . R~gulations: lnstitut_ional Structures and 
Responsibilities. Working Party on Telecommunication and Information Services Policies, 
Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, OECD, 11-21. 
52 See Better Regulation Task Force (2003). Independent Regulator, October 2003. Available online 
atwww.brtf.gov.uk 
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Self-regulation 
Co-regulation 
Limited State-regulation 
Figure 2: Interplay of regulatory models on different levels of stakeholders' participation 
Conversely, view from this perspective of retention of residual Minister powers and 
functions, albeit limited in scope but far-reaching in its impact, it may seems that the 
autonomous or the 'independence' of the regulator, i.e. the MCMC from any potential 
political pressure or other interested stakeholders 53, which is referred sometimes as 
'regulatory capture', may not be totally insulated as advocated by some academicians54. It 
may further appears that under the new regime the MCMC still needs to obtain approval 
from the Minister concern in regard to the yearly budget, both for the operational and 
developmental purposes. As such, financial autonomous dictates that the MCMC still 
subject to the direct purview of the Minister in this narrow sense. 
The issue of independence55 of the MCMC however necessarily calls for the scrutiny of 
other forms of safeguard prescribed under the new regime, the majority of which is 
procedural in nature, which dictates the openness and transparency of the decision 
making process which engaged, in most cases, stakeholders public consultation and 
53 See A. Estache, A. Goicoechea & M. Manacorda. (2006). Telecommunications Performance 
Reforms and Governance. World Bank Policy Research Paper 3822. 11-17. ' 
54 See T. Bakovic, B. Tenenbaum & F. Woolf .. (2003). Regulation by Contract: A New Way to 
Privatize Electricity Distribution. World Bank Working Pa~er.No.14, Chapter 2, 31-39. 
55 See A. Estache. (1997). Designing Regulatory lnstltutlons for Infrastructure - Lessons from 
Argentina. Public Policy for the Private Sector, The World Bank FDP Note No.114. 1-4 
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inquiry56. Apart from that, theoretically the decision-making unit of the MCMC comprises of 
a board of Commission which made up of board members 57 appointed from various 
background who came with vast industry experience and expertise, and their functional 
accountability, in the form of yearly report to the Minister is also made available to the 
public58. Perhaps, this new regime of regulatory approach which encompasses the whole 
range of different models of regulation for different stakeholders, at different levels of 
policy selection and decision making process as illustrated in Figure 2 above, manifests 
the wisdom of the drafter in view of the prevailing political, economic and social context 
peculiar to the local situation, with the ultimate aim of gravitates towards self-regulation 
once the market attains its equilibrium in the long run59. 
To summarize, the main attributes of the institutional structure prescribed under the new 
regime could be summed up in the following diagram: 
By detailed legislation? Yes 
Does it balance discretionary powers 
predictability? 
with Yes - clear procedural 
requirements are 
mandated 
Yes - Minister, MCMC, 
licensees and Industry 
Forums 
Does legislation specify regulator's responsibilities in Yes - CMA and CMCA 
detail? 1998 
Does it clearly define roles of different institutions? 
Sector specific? Yes - converged industry of communications and 
broadcastin 
Colle ial board? Yes - the board of 
56 As provided under Chapter 3, Part V which stipulates the powers of the Commission to conduct 
Inquiry and the procedures governing exercise of ~he same. . . 
57 See Part 11 CMCA which provides for the establishment of the board of cornrrussioners. 
58 See s.19 CMCA. 
59 The new regime is very similar to the Australian m?del. See evaluation on the Australian model in 
Senate Environment communications, Information Technology and the Arts References 
Committee, The Aust;alian Telecommunications Network, August 2004. And ?enate Environment, 
Communications, Information Technology and the Arts References Committee, Competition in 
Broadband Services, August 2004 Page I 27 
----------------------1-C~o:.:..m:..:...:missioners 
Separated from political and business interest? Yes 
the industry 
eal Tribunal 
Can decision be appealed? 
Yes Information gathering powers? 
Yes 
Yes 
Award, enforce and revoke license? 
Yes 
Yes exercisable 
through recommendation 
to the Minister 
Tenure of the Commissioners? 2 years (renewable up to 
5 terms 
Yes Dismissal rules and rocedures? 
Yes ----- 
Funding sources? Annual budget from 
MCMC fund subject to 
Minister a roval 
Full control of own funding? Partial subject to 
Minister a roval 
Yes 
Publish draft decision for comment? 
Yes - mandated 
No 
Publish decision with iusnflcation? 
Yes 
Yes 
Figure 3: Summary Attributes of the Institutional Structure under the new regime 
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Chapter 3: Regulatory Instruments under the New Regime 
Interaction between these various entities as shown in Figure 1 is fueled by the various 
types of regulatory instruments or enforcement decrees afforded under the new regime. 
Underlining this new institutional set up as depicted in Figure 1 is the clear demarcation of 
the delegated authority and exclusive powers of the State over this industry formerly 
exercised through the Minister to the Co-Regulatory body e.g. the MCMC. It would patently 
appear from close scrutiny of the powers and functions of the MCMC and the Minister as 
provided under the CMA and CMCA 1998 that there is clear functional distinction between 
the two entities. Under the new regime, the Minister retains his control on the overall 
industry policy whereas the MCMC focuses predominantly on the execution and 
implementation of the policy identified and adopted by the Ministry. In this sense, the 
MCMC is at the frontline of the administration dealing with the regulated industry and the 
stakeholders. It is premised on these dual functional separations that the various 
Regulatory Instruments operate. 
Again, to recapitulate, the rationale for the functional separation between the Minister, 
which represents the State, and the MCMC does not derive from thin air. Rather, this 
separation underpins the successful transition from the state-own monopoly industry to the 
competition based market environment to eradicate the service delivery failure under the 
former planned economy structure. The 'trade-off' in this new institutional structure is 
crucial as a form of 'carrot', as some theory may suggest, that is required to induce private 
investment and industry participation. Under this model, the State, through the Minister, is 
perceived best to reserve to the role of overall policy maneuvering and leave the execution 
and implementation to the regulator. 
Indeed research on the benefits and advantages of this form of liberalized institutional , 
setting is abundant based on similar experience in privatizing the industry in the more 
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advanced countries. In short, the core reason underlying this new institutional arrangement 
is to introduce the check and balance mechanism between the various entities with the 
participation from the regulated to ensure regulatory certainty, the foremost consideration 
for private investment. Yet at the same time, the ultimate backstop mechanism to prevent 
market failure is still locked in the hand of the Minister, to be exercised sparingly as the 
last resort. 
In light of the fundamental spirit upon which the new institutional structure rests, the 
limited state-regulation as between the Minister and the MCMC is maintained by the new 
instrument in the form of Direction, whereby the Minister may direct the MCMC to 
undertake certain act to give effect to the specific subject matter in accordance to the 
policy objectives entrenched under the new regime. This form of 'indirect order' sees the 
manifestation of the 'self-restraint' on the part of the Minister to interfere with the execution 
and administrative function entrusted on the regulator. On the other hand, the Minister 
decides policy matters expressly reserved to him under the CMA and CMCA 1998 through 
the instrument of Determination. It is observed that this instrument is prevalent in specific 
subject matters that carry substantial public and political interest, such as the rates 
regulation, licensing and spectrum assignment. Also, Declaration may be issued 
exclusively in regard to the matter pertaining to license conditions and any exemption 
thereof, while Regulations could be made by the Minister either on specific matters or 
procedures allowed under the Act or for any other matters to ensure compliance with the 
policy objectives from the regulated. 
Conversely, depends on the specific subject matters susceptible to regulation, which will 
be deliberated in detail herein below, broadly, the relationship between the MCMC and the 
regulated is mainly governed by the Commission Direction and Determination. These two 
forms of instruments represent the chief instruments for securing compliance to the policy 
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objectives in the liberalized telecommunications and broadcasting industries. In the former, 
contrary to the Ministerial Direction, which only binds the MCMC, the Commission 
Direction, seeks direct compliance from the regulated on any provisions in the Act. In the 
latter, as will be apparent in the subsequent discussion, Commission Determination 
operates within very narrow scope on very limited subjects, predominantly on matters 
pertaining to determination of competition and access interconnection arrangement. 
This is unsurprising as the nature of Determination deals essentially with policy 
consideration, which ought to be chiefly reserved for the Minister. Thus, the involvement of 
the Commission in this niche area is exceptional rather than norm. The justification for 
these 'exceptional delegation' perhaps is due to the highly technical issues involved 
whereby the Commission is better equipped with the expertise to deliberate on the same. 
Towards this end, being an exceptional function delegated to the Commission, it is evident 
that procedural safeguard in the form of Public Inquiry is envisaged prior to the issuance of 
any Commission Determination to assess whether the issuance of such Determination is 
warranted. The benchmark to institute a Public Inquiry is high: the Commission may hold a 
Public Inquiry only if it satisfied that the matter is of significant interest to either the public 
or to current or prospective licensees. 
Apart from those above captioned main regulatory instruments, specific guidelines, papers, 
registered voluntary industry codes, mandatory standard and registered undertaking 
furnished by the stakeholder complement the compliance tools mentioned in the foregoing 
portion. Whereas the process of public inquiry, consultation and other information 
gathering exercise initiated by the Commission in accordance with the relevant provisions 
under the Act may, in appropriate instances, serve as an early indication of the regulatory 
contemplation, which may in turn prepare or cushion the industry's expectation for any 
impending regulatory changes or forthcoming amendments. Under the new regime, the 
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Commission is empowered to initiate Investigation on the compliance status of the 
regulated in accordance to Chapter 4 Part V of CMA. Thus far, this provision has never 
been invoked by the MCMC but the underutilized section may prove invaluable in terms of 
forcing compliance from the regulated as this Investigation may serve as deterring 
regulatory threat, in the form of negative publicity on corporate governance apart from 
potential civil and criminal penalty for potential transgressions. 
It is important to note that all these form of regulatory instrument carry with the penal 
sanctions in the form of fines, and in certain instance, imprisonment for any willful non- 
compliance. In specific exceptional instruments such as registered voluntary industry code 
and mandatory standard, civil penalties in the form of fines may be imposed by the 
Commission. In order to appreciate the practical environment upon which each of these 
regulatory instruments operate, and be able to gauge the efficiency of their function upon 
the specific subject matters under regulation, each of these subject matters will be 
discussed under separate headings as below, with reference to the table of regulatory 
instruments as listed out in Appendix 1: 
3.1 Economic Regulation 
As detailed in Appendix 1, Economic Regulation encompasses three main components, 
namely licensing, competition practice and network access. It is apparent that matters 
relating to licensing are primarily under the direct purview of the Minister. The Minister may 
issue Determination, Declaration and Regulation to control the eligibility or exemptions of 
the applicants, the license conditions or any special and additional conditions, and the 
detail procedures governing the application, rejection and notification processes. The 
direct involvement of the Minister is inherited since the repealed Act. Indeed, naturally due 
to the peculiar fact that licensing plays the utmost critical role that correlates with the policy 
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of the government as to the extent of deregulation envisaged and thus the level of 
competition to be allowed in the market place, in direct intervention of the Minister is 
Inevitable. Contravention in the form of unlicensed activities, or non-compliance to the 
ministerial instruments dictates penal sanction of fine and imprisonment. 
On the other hand, as has been said earlier, matters related to general competition 
practice, in particular the assessment of the market condition and the determination of 
dominant market position of the regulated and any anti-competitive behavior are monitored 
and enforced by the Commission. To this end, since presumably the Commission is better 
equipped with the expertise, and thus able to respond promptly to any alleged anti- 
competitive conduct in the market, the operational aspect of the monitoring and 
enforcement is entrusted to the Commission. It is noted that anti-competitive conducts too 
entail similar penal sanction in the form of monetary penalty and imprisonment. Daily fine 
is further imposed for the continuing breaches of the prohibition. Furthermore, the 
Commission or any person affected by the contravention may, with the leave of the 
Commission, seeks civil redress from the court to enforce any provisions in this regard, 
while in the meantime, interlocutory or interim relief such as injunction may be applied 
against the prohibited conduct. In this sense, breaches of any prohibitions against anti- 
competition offences allow private enforcement in the civil court apart from any ex post 
sanction imposed or initiated by the Commission. 
Likewise, issues pertaining to network interconnection and access, which is the corner 
stone in promoting a level-playing field for the service-based competition among the 
licensees, requires highly technical understanding on the network environment and the 
corresponding access regime as well as the various methods of determining the access 
charges and fees. As such, the Commission is in charge of overseeing the access 
mechanism. Compare with the regulation imposed on anti-competition practice, access 
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and interconnection sees more participation envisaged from the regulated industry. Under 
this head of regulation, the obligation is shifted to the Access Forum to devise the Access 
code, which stipulates the agreed terms, and conditions, procedures and rate 
methodologies binding on all access seekers and granters. Refusal to grant access to 
network facilities or services listed in the access list is rendered with similar penal sanction 
in the form of fine and imprisonment. 
3.2 Technical Regulation 
Technical Regulation too covers three main components, namely Spectrum Assignment, 
Numbering and Electronic Addressing and Technical Standards. As with Licensing 
activities discussed above, spectrum, due to its inherent scarcity and its usage which may 
entails certain form of national security and public interest, and is further subject to 
international coordination and regulation, is under the direct control of the Minister. Albeit 
all the factors justifying the Minister's direct interference as alluded to above, the huge 
economy value derives from spectrum trading and auction for commercial rollout, perhaps 
resembles the most convincing reason for the state control. To this end, illegal usage of 
spectrum bands is subject to criminal sanction of similar fine and imprisonment terms. The 
Minister, as in Licensing, may utilize the instrument of Determination, Declaration and 
Regulation to control the usage of spectrum and to make rules and procedures for the 
assignment or exemption thereof. 
On the other hand, the other two components, i.e. Numbering and Electronic Addressing 
and Technical Standards clearly allow the delegation by the Commission of any or all 
functions pertaining thereto to qualified experts. This is more apparent for the development 
of Technical Standards whereby the Technical Standard Forum is greatly leveraged for the 
development of uniform standards under the Technical Code. Penal sanction is only 
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imposed on technical offences that tend to compromise public safety, for instance due to 
illegal radiation, or emission; or network apparatus that hinder network interoperability. 
3.3 Consumer Protection 
Consumer Protection records the most prevalent, yet unsurprising ministerial intervention, 
particularly in relation to provision of services at remote or the so called 'underserved' 
areas envisioned by the Universal Service Provision (USP) scheme and equitable access 
safeguard in the form of Rate Regulation and Required Application Service. On the other 
hand control on Quality of Service (QoS) is entrusted in the hand of the Commission, 
leveraging on the industry self-regulation mechanism entrenched in the Consumer Code 
devised by the Consumer Forum. Central to Consumer Protection is the requirement for 
the regulated to develop and put in place customer complaint handling procedures and 
disputes resolution mechanism. 
3.4 Social Regulation 
Social Regulation basically inherits the control over the broadcasting sector previously 
provided under the repealed Act but worded in more technology neutral term to tailor for 
the converged industry whereby it is the broadcast's content that is subject to regulation, 
irrespective of the mode of transmission. The Licensing aspect, naturally, subject to the 
Minister direct control. Illegal service provider is thus subject to penal sanction. The 
Content Regulation is again functions in accordance to the Content Code developed by 
the Content Forum, while criminal sanction may also be imposed by the Commission for 
offensive content, which is expressly prohibited under this section. 
3.5 Express Prohibitions and General Offences 
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It is observed that quite apart from the various regulatory instruments, which by and large 
laid down the policy objectives, requirements and procedures in regard to each specific 
area under regulation, as discussed in the foregoing, there are other form of sanctions 
provided under the CMA 1998, they are termed as 'Additional Offences' under the Act. 
These offences generally resemble the strict liability offences laid down in the repealed Act, 
which are still relevant today. Whereas there are also new, express prohibitions being 
introduced under the new Act. These new express prohibitions are mostly akin to strict 
liability offences and are catered within the very niche application of specific subject matter 
of regulation. More detail of this group of offences will be discussed in the subsequent 
discussion. 
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Chapter 4: Criminal Sanctions and the Possibility of Civil Enforcement 
As has been elaborately discussed in the foregoing chapter, to reiter te, bro 
criminal sanctions are levied against any transgressions for th foll wing c t gories of 
offences: (i) non-compliance of any regulatory Instrument be It issu d ith r b th Minister 
or the Commission. This may Includes subsidiary legislation in th f rm f Ministerial 
Regulations, as well as contravention of the voluntary industrial code, i.e. the Access Code, 
Technical Code, Content Code and Consumer Code. Even though non-conformance to 
these latter codes is not an offence per se, nevertheless, since compliance to these codes 
has been mandated as standard license condition, criminal penalties may still be invoked 
as breaching the license condition; (ii) contravention of specific prohibition expressly 
provided under the CMA 1998 which is peculiar to each subject matter. For instance, the 
express prohibition against anti-competitive conducts, collusive agreements, tying or 
linking arrangements, illegal service providers, offensive content etc. and (iii) contravention 
of the specific offences categorically labeled as 'Additional Offences' enumerated under 
Chapter 2 Part X of the Act. 
Against this backdrop, it appears that under the new regime, except in limited instances, 
criminal sanction is the default or primary option available against transgressions of any 
provisions under the CMA 1998. The tradition of criminal enforcement has its long origin 
rooted as seen in the repealed Act. However, then the scope of the offence was less 
complicated and centered primarily on some form of malicious damaging or tempering with 
the physical transmission network. Whereas under the new regime, new form of 
unprecedented offences has been introduced, which canvasses the whole spectrum of 
activities, which governs the economic, social, technical, and consumer aspects of the 
converged regulation. Under this peculiar circumstances, while ascribing non-compliance 
incidents with penal sanction may pose greater deterring effect, and in turn, arguably, 
better able to secure adherence from the regulated, it is doubtful whether criminal sanction 
alone is sufficient and represents the most expedient way to ensure effective compli nee 
from the regulated. Of more crucial is whether criminal sanction I suit bl f r II t pes of 
offences prescribed under the CMA 1998 and thus should be invok d indiff r ntl cross 
the board. 
Based on the statistic published by the Enforcement Department of the Commission6o 
' 
generally, it is evident that there is a steady upward trend in the volume of cases 
investigated for the period between 2005 and 200861. However, the volume of cases 
investigated does not seem to correlate, or reflect the severity of offences being breached. 
Close scrutiny of the statistic reveals that a huge proportion, in fact virtually all the cases 
investigated which involved the licensees comprise of the offence of non-compliance to 
license condition62 or failure to file the necessary audited account or contribution to the 
USP fund. All these breaches are essentially administrative in nature and do not seem to 
have any significant implication on the performance of the market. For instance, non- 
compliance to license condition is a generic term that denotes administrative offences that 
may vary within the spectrum of severity. It may includes the less significant or isolated 
offence of non-compliance to the various registered voluntary industry codes, such as the 
consumer code, or any written guidelines or subsidiary legislation issued by the 
Commission, to the more severe offence that connotes public interest such as breach of 
an undertaking in terms of network roll-out plan or committed investment in return for the 
grant of license or assignment of spectrum; or merger of dominant market players which 
may substantially lessening competition without prior notification and approval from the 
Commission. 
so The statistic is available online at ~he Commission's o~icial website at www.skmm.qov.my s: A total of 155 cases Investigated in 2005, 129 cases in 2006, 352 cases in 2007, and 343 cases 
In 2008 (as of 30 September 2008). . 
02 30 cases in 2005, 34 cases in 2006, 81 cases in 2007 and 161 cases in 2008. 
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In the absence of any detail information on the specific provision being bre ch d by the 
licensees, the only useful recourse is to refer to the statistic of c s b ing pr ut din 
court during the same period, assuming that offences of graver In n tur th t impli 
reaching public concern would have necessary been prosecuted In c urt Study on the 
statistic however indicates nothing of peculiar interest. In fact, it appears that very 
insignificant number of cases of this nature being charged in court63. Indeed, it is obvious 
that out of the total limited number of cases ultimately being charged in court, majority of 
the case fall under the category of 'Additional Offences' which has historically been 
prosecuted under the repealed Act64. OJ) 
~ 
i::: 
;) en 
§ 
These findings perhaps could be explained in view of the alternative enforcement"'g ~ 
;) ~ ~ 
remedies of civil fine in the form of compound, exercisable by the Commission65 as well as ~ :2. 
~·.::: ..... ,,, 
the other compliance tools, in particular the Commission Direction, which has thus far ~· .~ 
OJ 'c: 
CL. - 
exhibited satisfactory compliance without the need for further criminal prosecution in 
court66. The availability of these two forms of alternative enforcement tools has witnessed 
significant reduction in cases being prosecuted in court. In fact, it is believed that due to 
63 No cases of this nature being charged in 2005 and 2006, 7 cases in 2007 whereby 5 cases were 
later being withdrawn upon payment of compound between .RM8,000 - RM10,000 by the offender. 
2 other cases still pending hearing. 2 cases being charged in 2008, whereby one of the case was 
due to failure to contribute to the USP fund. Both cases pending hearing. 
64 Offences such as fraudulent or improper use of the service, counterfeit equipment, non-standard 
equipment, damage or tempering with the transmission system, and that of illegal or unlicensed 
service provider. 
65 S.243 CMA 1998 reading together with s.2 of the Communications and Multimedia 
(Compounding of Offences) Regulations 2001 renders all offences under the CMA and its 
associates subsidiary legislation susceptible to compound by the Chairman with the written 
approval of the Deputy Public Prosecutor (OPP). This alternative bar any further criminal 
prosecution upon payment of the compound - per s.243(3). Based on the statistic of cases being 
compounded from 2005-2008, it appears that .the. num?er of cases being compounded is 
proportionate to the increasing volume of cases being investigate?: Also, it is noticed that there is a 
steady trend of increase in the amount of the co~pound .tor specinc type of offences, such as non- 
standard equipment, breach of license condition, failure to summit accounting report, and 
unlicensed service provision. 
66 For example so far the Commission has Issued 2 Direction on particular licensees in 2006 
(Direction No. 1 of 2006) and 2007 (Direction No.1 of 2007) respectively to seek compliance and 
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the harsh and penal effect of criminal prosecution, and the long delay of criminal 
proceedings in court67, the Commission has exhibited the preference for th s two 
alternative enforcement tools, the former is employed since the n tur f th 
be invoked to secure direct compliance from the offending lie ns for condu t which 
entails more serious implications. As such, with the introduction of these civil fines 
mechanism and the operation of Commission Direction, the Commission retains more 
discretion and flexibility to decide the most efficacious way of enforcement depending on 
the nature of the provisions being breached and the blameworthiness of the perpetrator. 
Apart from that, it is obvious that civil enforcement mechanism is also introduced under the 
new regime, but its application is limited only to the enforcement of any provisions 
pertaining to prohibition of anti-competitive conducts68. The Commission or individual 
affected by the contravention may initiate the civil action. In the case of individual bringing 
the action, further control on this civil enforcement mechanism is subject to leave to be 
granted by the Commission prior to the initiation of the civil proceeding in court. However, 
pending the same, the Commission or the individual may apply to the court for interim 
injunction against the prohibited conduct. Thus far, there is no reported case that have 
invoked this provision and as such the effectiveness of this mechanism is yet to be tested. 
Despite the foregoing, it appears that the enforcement mechanism provided under the new 
regime assimilates very closely to the 'Pyramid of Enforcement Theory', which has been 
greatly deployed in the regulatory environment in Australia, particularly so in area of 
ordered to decease the alleged anti.-comp~tition ~r~ctice. A new case was investigated in 2008 
~ertaining to the same offence and still pending declslon of the Commission. 
7 See for instance there are reported cases shown under the statistic published by the Commission 
whereby prosecution In court has been Initiated since 2006 but are still pending disposal in court as 
of 2008. 
8 See s.142(2) CMA 1998 
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securities law enforcement and anti-trust regulation. Under this theory, criminal 
prosecution in court situated at the apex of the pyramid of enforcement and only t be 
deployed sparingly as remedy of last resort. Other alternative enforcem nt d er , which 
are largely administrative in nature, such as warning, and letter to show t rt with 
the least penal in nature, initiation of public investigation and inquiry t ivil fin s and 
public reprimand and suspension of license, regulator's direction, civil enforcement and 
revocation of license, and ultimately criminal prosecution in court. While overseas research 
has shown promising enforcement efficacy based on this model, it is still unclear of its 
local application as no significant development has been observed thus far. As such, its 
efficacy in the local context, especially in cases of public concern, has yet to be proven. 
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Conclusion 
The new regulatory regime introduced under the CMA and CMCA 1998 h n th 
exclusive discretion and control over policy matters, the regul tor is ntrust d with the 
execution and enforcement of the various regulations envisaged for the achievement of 
the goals spelt out under the policy objectives. To this end, the CMA and CMCA clearly 
paint the functions and the corresponding powers of the different entity set-up under the 
new institutional structure. Underlining this new institutional structure is the various 
regulatory instruments and the procedures for invocation of each of them respectively. 
Central to these various forms of regulatory instruments is the new enforcement 
mechanism put in place to secure compliance of those regulatory instruments. Based on 
our discussion, it appears that even though penal sanction in the form of fine and 
imprisonment represents the default option against such breaches, alternative 
enforcement tools, in the form of civil fines and Commission Direction managed to ensure 
speedy and cost effective compliance as compare to criminal sanction. Though the 
deterring effect of criminal prosecution could not be discounted in cases of most severe in 
nature, whereby transgressions of such cases may render significant or devastating 
repercussion on the market or public, alternative enforcement tools of less penal in nature, 
such as warning, letter to show cause or seeking explanation, initiation of public 
investigation or inquiry, public reprimand, civil fines, suspension or the ultimate revocation 
of license and civil enforcement may well achieve the desirable compliance. These less 
penal enforcement are particularly useful in regard to economic offences such as engaging 
in anti-competitive conduct, or offences committed by body corporate, whereby financial 
and negative publicity on corporate governance may, in appropriate cases, deemed 
sufficient regulatory threat to secure compliance. While based on the enforcement statistic 
published by the Commission, this alternative enforcement mechanism seems to function 
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satisfactorily, however, due to the lack of enforcement of cases of significant public interest, 
the new regulatory regime, and the corresponding effectiveness of the nforcement 
mechanism is yet to be tested, particularly in the area of civil enforcement. 
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